O último McKinsey Quarterly traz uma bordagem interessante sobre o que chamam de "duas crises bancárias". Uma, a da securitização de imíeis, estaria controlada pela intervenção dos Bancos Centrais. Outra, a dos defaults em empréstimos os mais diversos como cartões de crédito, empréstimos estudantis e outras formas de crédito, deve se materializar em sua plenitude apenas daqui a dois anos! e o pior, 2/3 dos ativos bancários nos EUA estão adossados a essa forma de crédito.
E o pior, o artigo mostra que até o final de 2010 os bancos terão perdas acumuladas superiores aos 2 trilhões de dólares, frente aos 930 bilhões de dólares reconhecidos até o momento! Arffffff... Para os autores, pertencentes a uma grande consultoria financeira, o sistema bancário norte-americano enfrenta um ambiente "desafiador" para o futuro próximo. O que será que isso quer dizer?
Nas palavras dos autores:
"The good news is that we appear to be seeing the end of this credit securities crisis. That is in part due to the clarity provided by the stress test exercise and the ongoing commitment on the part of government not to allow a large-scale bank failure. The other credit crisis is a commercial-bank lending crisis. While this crisis also stemmed from bad residential mortgages, it involves a broader array of lending, including commercial real-estate loans, credit card loans, auto loans, and leveraged/high-yield loans, all of which are now going bad because of the economic downturn. The bulk of these loans are subject to hold-to-maturity accounting, which, in contrast to fair-market accounting, typically does not recognize losses until the loans default. The bad news is that this crisis is still in its early stages and may take two years or more to work through the credit losses from these loans.
Of course, all large financial institutions hold both kinds of credit assets on their books. Some of the largest broker–dealers hold 70 percent of their assets at fair value, while some regional banks hold up to 90 percent of their assets in hold-to-maturity accounts. For the banking and securities industry as a whole, about two-thirds of assets are subject to hold-to-maturity accounting.
It might seem odd that accounting methodologies can make such a big difference. At the end of the day, what counts is the net present value of the cash flows from each asset, but those are unknowable until after a debt is repaid. Fair-value accounting, based on mark-to-market principles, immediately discounts assets when the expectation of a default arises and ability to trade the assets declines. Fair-value therefore makes the holder of the assets look worse, sooner. Hold-to-maturity accounting works in reverse and makes the holder look better for a longer time."
Of course, all large financial institutions hold both kinds of credit assets on their books. Some of the largest broker–dealers hold 70 percent of their assets at fair value, while some regional banks hold up to 90 percent of their assets in hold-to-maturity accounts. For the banking and securities industry as a whole, about two-thirds of assets are subject to hold-to-maturity accounting.
It might seem odd that accounting methodologies can make such a big difference. At the end of the day, what counts is the net present value of the cash flows from each asset, but those are unknowable until after a debt is repaid. Fair-value accounting, based on mark-to-market principles, immediately discounts assets when the expectation of a default arises and ability to trade the assets declines. Fair-value therefore makes the holder of the assets look worse, sooner. Hold-to-maturity accounting works in reverse and makes the holder look better for a longer time."
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